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Are regions important in British elections? Valence politics and local 
economic contexts at the 2010 General Election 
 
Abstract: Electoral support for governing parties and their major rivals is influenced by 
valence judgements, particularly over economic policy performance. Economic voting 
contributes in large measure to the changing geography of the vote, as economic conditions 
vary from place to place. But past work has tended to concentrate on objective economic 
indicators or on voters’ personal evaluations of the state of the economy. Furthermore, work 
on contextual effects has suggested that these work most powerfully when very local, 
suggesting that the wider regional patterns which dominate much research on electoral 
geographies are artefacts of more intimate geographies. This paper expands the debate in two 
ways: first, by examining the extent to which voters’ decisions are influenced by the 
economic evaluations of others in their communities; and second, by demonstrating that some 
contextual effects, at least, really are more powerful at the regional than at more local scales. 
 
Key words: Valence politics; electoral geography; economic voting 
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Are regions important in British elections? Valence politics and local 
economic contexts at the 2010 General Election 
 
The dismal science exerts a powerful grip over government re-election prospects: while 
economic booms can give incumbents an aura of competence, and smooth the way to their re-
election by a grateful electorate, recessions and downturns can heighten concerns over 
governments’ effectiveness, and may lead to defeat at the ballot box. Had Jane Austen been a 
political scientist, she might have argued that it is a truth (almost) universally acknowledged 
that a government presiding over a recession will soon be in want of a parliamentary 
majority.  
 
Voters’ perceptions of the state of the economy provide the key link in the causal chain from 
economic trends to government support (Sanders et al., 1987).  When judging the efficacy of 
governments’ economic policies, they can access a variety of information sources. The exact 
content of the information will depend on the scale to which the information applies and the 
context in which it is encountered. Some information comes from the state of the objective 
economy nationally (partly filtered through media reporting: Gavin et al., 1996; Gavin and 
Sanders, 2003): unemployment rates, inflation, interest rates, exchange rates and so on. Some 
comes from individuals’ own direct experiences: do they feel more or less affluent, more or 
less confident about the future, is their job secure or threatened? And some comes from their 
local contexts, at a variety of scales: sub-national variations in economic performance can be 
substantial, and some regions may be in recession (or enjoying strong growth) while the 
national economy is booming (or slumping).  
 
A large research literature has built up around all these propositions (see, inter alia, Sanders 
et al., 1987; Lewis-Beck, 1988; Powell and Whitten, 1993; Van der Brug et al., 2007; 
Johnston and Pattie, 2006; Pattie and Johnston, 1995, 2008a). However, rather less attention 
has been paid to another information source within voters’ local contexts: to what extent are 
people influenced by the economic views of those they live among and at what scale does this 
operate most effectively? Perceived local climates of opinion have been shown to affect 
electors’ propensity to turn out (this being more likely where individuals think those around 
them value voting than where they do not: Campbell, 2006; Gerber et al., 2008, 2010; 
Davenport et al., 2010; Panagopolous, 2010; Pattie and Johnston, 2013) and their party 
choices and political values. (Other things being equal, people are likely to adapt their 
choices and views to match those which are locally dominant: Johnston and Pattie, 2006; 
McClurg, 2004, 2006.)  But does this extend to economic evaluations? One might conceive a 
situation in which some voters are surrounded by others with a generally pessimistic outlook 
on the economy, while others live among more optimistic individuals. If voters do take into 
account either or both of the views of those they live among and their current situations, this 
might also extend, therefore, to an influence on their economic evaluations – with knock-on 
consequences for their decisions on whether to vote for or against the incumbent government. 
In this paper, we explore that link further by examining how the general climate of opinion 
on the economy affected how individuals voted at the 2010 General Election in Great Britain, 
and by asking at what scale the climate of opinion was most influential. 
 
Valence politics and the geography of the vote 
A radical change has occurred in how analysts think of the factors driving election results. 
Traditional accounts of voting behaviour emphasise the importance of ideological contests 
and clashes of ideas, long-standing psychological attachments to parties, or the sociological 
undercurrents of party support. But in recent years, these positional approaches (so-called 
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because they stress issues on which voters adopt opposing positions and beliefs) have been 
eclipsed. In their stead, the dominant thread in the literature now examines voters’ 
evaluations of government performance on so-called valence issues (e.g. Clarke et al., 2004, 
2009). These are policy areas on which virtually all members of a society agree: all want 
prosperity, security, good health, and so on. In a valence world, voters are not too worried 
about how a universally-desired outcome is achieved. What concerns them is that it is 
achieved. Governments that deliver (and are seen to do so) on valence issues improve their 
chances of re-election, while those that fail risk defeat at the polls.  
 
Valence concerns can cover a wide range of issues, and take in evaluations of parties’ 
competence and suitability for office. But one valence factor dominates the literature: 
economic performance (though, as we will discuss later in the paper, economic policy can 
also be associated with positional politics: Lewis-Beck and Nadeau, 2011; Lewis-Beck et al., 
2013). The economy is sufficiently complex to leave most voters uncertain over the pros and 
cons of different policy details. But hardly anyone in a modern society is immune to 
economic success or failure. Most are aware of generally rising or falling living standards. To 
the extent that governments get the credit or blame for economic performance, therefore, the 
economy should be a prime factor in shaping voters’ choices supports this claim (Fiorina, 
1981; Lewis-Beck, 1988; Norpoth, 1992; MacKuen et al., 1992; Van der Brug et al., 2007; 
Samuels and Hellwig, 2010; Johnston and Pattie, 2011). If things are going well, there is a 
good case for voting the current government back into office. But if they are doing badly, 
perhaps it is time to remove them and give others a chance.  
 
One strand of that literature, of relevance to this paper, focuses on the electoral effects of 
geographical variations in economic performance. Most countries experience sometimes 
substantial sub-national variations in local economic conditions. Some areas can enjoy 
affluence and growth at the same time as others suffer relative poverty and decline. To the 
extent that economic performance becomes a thermometer for wider valence judgements on 
how well (or badly) a government is performing, therefore, people living in different parts of 
a country may well come to rather different conclusions regarding the government’s record, 
depending on how their local economy is faring. Even if the national economy is perceived as 
performing strongly, therefore, and even if a voter is becoming more prosperous as an 
individual, he or she may still have concerns over the government’s competence and re-
electability if his or her local economy is thought to be in trouble (Pattie and Johnston, 1995; 
Pattie et al., 1997; Johnston and Pattie, 2001, 2006; Johnston, Dorling et al., 2000).   
 
Such sub-national economic evaluations operate at a wide variety of scales: voters respond to 
conditions in their immediate home neighbourhoods and in their wider communities 
(Johnston, Pattie et al., 2000). However, recent research into the scale at which contextual 
effects operate in British elections find that more local contexts – like households, 
neighbourhoods, constituencies – are much more important as influences on the vote than are 
regional contexts (Johnston et al., 2007: indeed, in their analyses, regional effects disappear 
once individual factors and more local contexts are taken into account). The implication is 
that, the considerable research interest in regional divides in British voting notwithstanding, 
voters are most influenced by things close to home, not by conditions at more generalised 
scales. But this does not necessarily close the debate. Few local economies are so small as to 
be contained within one parliamentary constituency, for instance. Many travel-to-work areas 
(TTWAs) can, for example, encompass cities, suburbs and rural hinterlands. Economic 
successes or failures in one part of a TTWA are liable to have substantial knock-on 
consequences for other parts. Furthermore, most Britons obtain much of their local news 
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from regional television broadcasters, whose networks often cover several TTWAs and many 
more constituencies and neighbourhoods. News stories about job losses or new investments 
are likely to be disseminated much more widely than the immediate local labour market 
directly affected, therefore, potentially giving individuals a wider sense of the state of their 
local economy than that on their own doorsteps. There may still be a case for examining the 
impact of broader scales than the immediately local. 
 
There is clear evidence that most people have a reasonable general impression of the 
strengths and weaknesses of the local economies in which they live and work. Individuals’ 
perceptions of the health of their local economies correlate well with objective indicators 
such as local unemployment rates and information on the state of the local housing market 
(Pattie et al., 1997). To a large extent, this is the result of direct observation and experience. 
For instance, one’s chances of being unemployed, or of knowing someone who has lost a job, 
are likely to be higher if one lives in an area where local unemployment rates are high than in 
one where they are low. 
 
Direct experience is not the only means by which individuals form views of their local 
contexts, however. The views and opinions of others matter too (Huckfeldt and Sprague, 
1995; Huckfeldt et al., 2004; Pattie and Johnston, 1999, 2008b, 2013; Zuckerman et al., 
2007; Nir, 2011). Other things being equal, individuals can be influenced by the climate of 
opinion among their acquaintances and communities. Where they find themselves in a 
minority on an issue, for instance, they may re-evaluate their own position, bringing it into 
line with the majority view. Most analyses of such contextual effects to date have focussed on 
factors such as the partisan make-up of individuals’ social networks. However, there is no 
reason why attention should be limited just to this aspect of local opinion. Other politically 
salient factors are also likely to be widely discussed and commented on within local 
communities.  
 
The state of the local economy is one such issue. People routinely talk to each other about 
local economic fortunes. The more these conversations stress a particular trajectory for the 
local economy, the more reinforcement that view receives. Rising house prices – and hence 
growing assets for home owners – are a cliché of middle class dinner party discussions when 
local housing markets boom. Conversely, the worse the local economic news, the more likely 
individuals are to encounter pessimistic views from others – and the more pessimistic one 
might expect them to become in consequence. The local media (both press and, at a more 
regional scale in the UK, television and radio), help develop this local climate of opinion, 
whether reporting new investment in an area or more local redundancies. Whereas word-of-
mouth discussions are most likely to contribute to a climate of opinion within a relatively 
circumscribed locale (perhaps a neighbourhood for conversations with friends, or a travel-to-
work area for conversations with work colleagues), local media (especially broadcast media) 
mainly operate at a more regional scale, giving a wider perspective on whether the area is 
becoming more or less prosperous. 
 
To what extent are individuals influenced by the local climate of opinion regarding the state 
of the economy, and how local is local when we consider this? It is to these questions that the 
paper now turns, through an analysis of the impact on voting at the 2010 UK General 
Election. 
 
From boom to bust: economic trends and government fortunes 2005-2010 
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The run-up to the 2010 General Election did not bode well for the incumbent Labour 
government. In power continuously since 1997, Labour had successfully rebuilt its reputation 
as a viable party of government by both modernising its policies to appeal to an increasingly 
middle class electorate (Shaw, 1994; Gould, 1998; Heath et al., 2001) and (crucially) by 
capturing from the Conservatives a reputation for competent handling of the UK’s economy 
(Sanders, 1999). Beginning in the mid-1990s, the UK economy moved into a prolonged 
period of growth and prosperity. The Labour government elected in 1997 enjoyed the fruits 
of the boom, which continued almost unbroken for the next decade: GDP grew strongly, 
while the unemployment rate fell (figures 1 and 2). The strong economy was an important 
plank in Labour’s successful 2001 and 2005 re-election campaigns (Clarke et al., 2004, 2009; 
Pattie, 2001, 2004). As Labour’s Chancellor from 1997 to 2007, Gordon Brown had been the 
central figure in the party’s economic team and he took much of the credit for the national 
economy’s strong performance under his stewardship (hubristically announcing, in his 2006 
budget speech, there would be ‘no return to boom and bust’: Hansard, 22 March 2006, 
column 288). He hoped to capitalise on this record when he took over from Tony Blair as 
Labour leader and Prime Minister in 2007.  
 
In retrospect, however, 2007 was the point at which the long economic boom came to an 
abrupt end (Gamble, 2009; Moran et al., 2011). The first indications of trouble came from 
concerns over banks’ exposure to increasingly vulnerable sub-prime mortgages in the US 
housing market (both in the UK and internationally). In the UK, a further dramatic signal 
came in late 2007 with a run on Northern Rock, a bank based in the North East of England 
which was particularly exposed as a major mortgage lender. The economic crisis developed 
rapidly over the subsequent year, engulfing much of the world economy and turning a 
financial crisis into a deep recession (Stiglitz, 2010). From the beginning of 2008, UK GDP 
declined for 6 consecutive quarters before staging an anaemic recovery in mid-2009 (figure 
1). By the 2010 election, it was still below the levels reached by the end of 2007. Similarly, 
after several years of improving figures, Britain’s unemployment rate began to climb rapidly 
from late 2008 onwards, reaching over 8% by May 2010.  
 
In late 2008, Alistair Darling, Brown’s successor as Chancellor, warned that the economic 
downturn was potentially the most serious since the Great Depression of the 1930s (Darling, 
2011). Brown and Darling worked hard, via their domestic policies and their pivotal actions 
in a series of international summits, to prevent the recession turning into a full-blown 
depression, and Brown in particular argued that his experience and standing in international 
economic policy circles were what Britain needed to see it through the coming difficulties. 
These efforts notwithstanding, however, this was not auspicious for a party, and a leader, 
which had built their recent reputation in government on their ability to deliver prosperity. 
 
Not surprisingly, the economy loomed large in voters’ thinking in the run-up to the 2010 
election, and their predominant mood was gloomy. Shortly before the election took place, 
respondents to the 2010 British Election Study Campaign Internet Panel Survey (BES CIPS: 
for reasons outlined below, this is the main data set for much of the following analysis) were 
asked which was, in their opinion, the most important issue facing the country: 48% said it 
was the economy, while a further 5% mentioned unemployment. Far more said this than 
mentioned any other issue. Asked how the country’s economic situation had changed over the 
previous year, 58% felt it had worsened (and 28% thought things had become a lot worse), 
while only 23% thought things had improved (and less then 1% thought they had improved a 
great deal: table 1). Nor did respondents think the future would be much better, either for 
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themselves or for the country. For the first time since the early 1990s, therefore, Labour 
entered a Westminster election looking distinctly vulnerable. 
 
That said, Labour was not alone in facing difficulties because of the downturn. In the balmy 
economic conditions before 2007, the Conservatives’ new leader, David Cameron, and his 
Shadow Chancellor, George Osborne, had committed their party to matching the Labour 
government’s spending plans (an attempt to reassure voters not only that the Conservatives 
would not threaten the prosperity Labour seemed to have delivered but also to counter the 
perception that popular public services were not safe in their hands). The crisis forced the 
Conservatives to rethink their economic strategy radically. Furthermore, for all Labour’s, and 
Brown’s, travails after 2007, Labour’s reputation for economic competence, while tarnished, 
was not totally destroyed, while the Conservatives’ reputation in this field, severely damaged 
by the 1992 ERM crisis, was not fully restored. The BES CIPS pre-election survey also asked 
respondents which party and which leader would be best able to deal with the country’s 
economic problems (table 2). Going into the election, the Conservatives and David Cameron 
had a lead over Labour and Gordon Brown on the issue, but only a narrow one. If the crisis 
was bad news for the government, therefore, nor was not a clear-cut opportunity for the 
opposition.  
 
Economic geography and electoral outcomes in 2010 
As we might expect, valence judgements played an important part in influencing voters’ 
choices at the 2010 election (Johnston and Pattie, 2011; Clarke et al., 2011). And as in 
previous downturns, the post-2007 recession did not hit all parts of the country to the same 
extent. Some areas found themselves under greater stress than others. To find out what effect 
local economic contexts had on the outcome of the 2010 election, however, we need some 
measure of local economic context. Unemployment statistics provide one readily available 
indicator. There is, however, a complication, as many of the constituencies in England and 
Wales (but not in Scotland) were redrawn between the 2005 and 2010 elections. To be able to 
assess local economic trends over time, therefore, we ideally need an indicator that gives 
local conditions in constituencies not only in 2010 but also in 2005 (and hence for which 
earlier data have been recast into the new constituencies): we have therefore accessed the 
National Online Manpower Information Service (NOMIS) data on the proportion of the local 
population aged between 16 and 64 claiming job seekers allowance, as these data have been 
estimated for each 2010 constituency and for each month between the 2005 and 2010 
elections. 
 
As a first cut at estimating the impact of local electoral context on the results of the 2010 
election, we look at the impact of the local percentage of working age adults claiming Job 
Seekers’ Allowance (JSA, a proxy for local unemployment rates) on constituency results. 
There is, however, a complication. While the economy is generally now seen as a valence 
issue, it can also provide the basis for positional politics (Lewis-Beck and Nadeau, 2011; 
Lewis-Beck et al., 2013; Nadeau et al., 2010; Dassonville and Lewis-Beck, 2013). Normally, 
the local unemployment rate (or equivalent) is thought of in voting models as a valence 
measure: higher local unemployment rates indicate poorer performance and hence falling 
support for the government. But unemployment can also be a positional measure: parties of 
the left (Labour in the UK context) are usually seen as better serving the needs of the 
unemployed than are parties of the right, hence the higher the local unemployment rate in an 
area, the greater the support we might expect for Labour, and the lower the support for the 
Conservatives. When the incumbent government is Conservative, therefore, both the 
positional and valence implications of unemployment tend to run in the same direction: the 
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higher local unemployment levels are, the lower the support for the Conservatives. But where 
a Labour government is seeking re-election, valence and positional perspectives on 
unemployment lead to very different conclusions. From a valence perspective, higher 
unemployment levels should lead to lower support for the (Labour) government, as its 
economic policies are not delivering prosperity. But from a positional point of view, higher 
unemployment should lead to greater support for Labour, as that party is generally seen as the 
‘better’ party for the unemployed.  
 
Pattie and Johnston (2008) suggest a strategy for escaping this dilemma. They treat the 
constituency unemployment rate at a fixed point in time as a position measure (as it indicates 
levels of affluence or poverty in a seat), and the change over time in the unemployment rate 
as a valence measure (are things getting better or worse locally). Their analysis of 
constituency voting patterns at the 2005 election illustrates the utility of this approach: the 
Labour government did better, and the Conservative opposition worse, in seats where 
unemployment was high than where it was low (as predicted by the positional perspective). 
But Labour did worse and the Conservatives better the greater the local growth in the 
unemployment rate over time (as a valence perspective would suggest). We therefore 
replicate this strategy for constituency voting trends at the 2010 election, both to validate 
Pattie and Johnston’s claim and to gain an initial insight into the impact of local economic 
context at the 2010 election. 
 
Each party’s percentage share of the constituency vote in 2010 is regressed against three 
variables (Table 3): the party’s local vote share in 2005 (which both controls for long-term 
geographies of party loyalty and also turns our model into an analysis of change in vote share 
between 2005 and 2010);
1
 the percentage of 16-64 year olds in each constituency claiming 
JSA in May 2010 (the ‘positional’ measure); and the change in the percentage claiming JSA 
between May 2005 and May 2010 (the ‘valence’ measure, capturing shifting conditions over 
the lifetime of the 2005-2010 parliament).
2
 
 
As anticipated, vote share at the 2005 election is by far the most important factor in each 
equation. Parties’ geographies of support in 2005 were a consistently good guide to the 
equivalent geographies in 2010. Areas of relative strength and weakness for each party tend 
not to change dramatically from one election to the next. 
 
Local economic conditions, as indexed by the two JSA measures, also affected party vote 
shares in the hypothesised directions. As predicted by the positional perspective on local 
unemployment rates, the higher the proportion of 16-64 year-olds claiming JSA in a 
constituency, the higher Labour’s share of the vote in 2010, and the smaller the 
Conservatives’ and the Liberal Democrats’. The less affluent the area, the better Labour did 
and the worse the other two parties performed. But change in JSA levels since the previous 
election affected vote shares in the directions predicted by the valence perspective. The more 
the proportion seeking JSA had grown in an area, ceteris paribus, the worse the Labour 
candidate did and the better the Conservatives fared. At this aggregate scale, at least, there is 
evidence that voters were reacting to their local economic contexts in 2010, punishing the 
government and rewarding the main opposition for worsening local conditions (Curtice, 
2010, 389). 
 
Local economic context and the individual voter 
Are these aggregate, ecological, findings replicated when we look at individual voters’ 
behaviour? The 2010 BES CIPS data have several advantages for addressing the question. 
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The survey has a very large sample size (over 13,300 respondents), increasing its potential as 
a source of information on sub-national contexts. Furthermore, while most conventional 
surveys interview in only a sample of constituencies, meaning there may be problems of 
representativeness when looking at scales below the national, CIPS, unusually, has 
respondents from almost every constituency in Great Britain.
3
 Both factors allow us to 
estimate local climates of opinion at a variety of scales, a feature we utilise in the next 
section. In addition, the panel interviewed the same individuals before, during and after the 
2010 election campaign, providing access to individuals’ pre-election dispositions (post-
election cross-sectional surveys can ask about these dispositions, but the responses are 
inevitably affected to some degree by both the campaign and by the election outcome, 
creating difficulties for modelling). 
 
Our first step is to build baseline individual-level models for vote choice in 2010 (table 4).
4
 A 
binary logistic model is estimated for votes for each of the major parties, with the y-variable 
coded 1 if the individual reported voting for the party in the post-election wave of CIPS, and 
0 if they voted for another party or abstained.
5
 The models control for individuals’ self-
reported votes in 2005, taken from the first, pre-election, panel wave. This replicates the basic 
design of the constituency models discussed above, turns the logistic models into analyses of 
how individuals changed their votes between 2005 and 2010, and provides some control for 
longer-term determinants of party support. In addition, the models include three measures of 
individuals’ economic positions and evaluations, also from the first panel wave (respondents’ 
perceptions of how the national economy had changed over the preceding twelve months; 
their personal sense of exposure to the financial crisis; and their main source of income 
(allowing us to contrast those in employment with those on benefits or other income 
sources).
6
 In addition, contextual variables measured objective economic conditions in each 
respondent’s constituency. As in the constituency analyses, we employ the percentage of 16-
64 year olds in each constituency claiming JSA in May 2010, and the change in that 
percentage between May 2005 and May 2010. Finally, the ACORN socio-demographic 
classification was used to assign each respondent’s constituency to one of its five categories 
reflecting a rough continuum from the most affluent to the most hard-pressed areas.
7
 
 
Not surprisingly, people who reported voting for a party in 2005 were more likely than non-
voters then (both those who abstained in 2005 and those too young to vote) to vote for the 
same party in 2010. And voting for one of the ‘big three’ parties in 2005 made it less likely 
that an individual would vote for one of its rivals in 2010. 
 
Individual economic evaluations and situations played a part too. Consistent with the valence 
perspective, the better individuals felt the national economy had performed in the year prior 
to the election, the more likely they were to vote for the Labour government and the less 
likely to vote for the Conservative opposition. As the model already controls for 2005 voting, 
this illustrates the impact of voters’ economic evaluations on how their vote choice changed 
in 2010. And the effect is substantial. For instance, other things being equal, the odds of 
someone who felt the economy had improved a great deal over the preceding year voting 
Labour were 9.3 times higher than the equivalent odds for someone who thought the national 
economy had become a lot worse. As discussed above, however, the problem for Labour in 
2010 was that very few people indeed saw signs of strong economic recovery, while most 
thought the economy was stagnant or in decline. 
 
To some extent, personal circumstances had an additional influence on how respondents 
voted. In line with positional arguments, individuals whose main income source came from 
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state benefits were less likely to vote Conservative or Liberal Democrat in 2010 than were 
those in employment – again even after past vote is controlled for.  And pensioners were less 
likely than those in work to vote Liberal Democrat. But, intriguingly, individuals’ perceptions 
of how much they had been affected personally by the financial crisis had little influence on 
vote choice. Of the 9 coefficients for this variable (3 in each of the 3 models), only one 
reached statistical significance. Individuals who felt they had not been affected very much by 
the crisis were somewhat more likely to vote for Labour than were those who felt they had 
been affected a great deal (consistent, obviously, with a valence argument). 
 
Over and above individuals’ personal circumstances and views, there is some evidence that 
local economic context influenced their vote decisions; most of the evidence presented here 
points towards a positional rather than a valence interpretation, however. The higher the 
proportion of adults in respondents’ constituencies on JSA at the time of the 2010 election, 
for instance, the greater the likelihood of individuals voting Labour and the smaller the 
likelihood of voting either Conservative or Liberal Democrat. Similarly, individuals living in 
more economically marginal areas (as indexed by the coefficients for each constituency’s 
ACORN category: the comparison in all cases is the most affluent ACORN category, 
‘Wealthy Achievers’, and the other categories are represented by dummy variables and 
appear in the table in descending order of general affluence), the greater the likelihood of 
voting Labour and the lower th  likelihood of voting either Conservative or (for those in the 
most hard-pressed areas at least) Liberal Democrat. Individuals in poorer neighbourhoods 
were more likely to vote for Labour – the party with the strongest long-term association with 
representing the interests of the poor – than to vote for either of the other two parties. But, 
unlike the aggregate models reported earlier, changes in the local economic situation over 
time, at least as indexed by the change between 2005 and 2010 in the percentage claiming 
JSA, had no statistically discernible effect on individual vote choice in 2010 once the other 
factors reported here are taken into account. 
 
Local climates of opinion as valence effects at various spatial scales 
So far, the results replicate in large measure previous analyses of economic voting and of the 
importance of local economic context on vote choice. However, the CIPS data provide an 
unusual opportunity to examine the impact of not just the ‘objective’ economy in each area 
but also that of the local climate of opinion. Other things being equal, were individuals who 
lived in communities where the balance of opinion on the state of the economy was relatively 
pessimistic more likely to punish the government than were those who lived in more 
optimistic communities? The following analyses explore the local climate of opinion at three 
different scales. The first scale is that of the respondent’s parliamentary constituency. CIPS 
respondents lived in 629 constituencies throughout Great Britain (Northern Ireland is 
excluded). On average, there are 23 CIPS respondents in each constituency, though this 
varies substantially. The second scale analysed is that of the major local government areas. 
Counties have considerable public visibility and often engender a strong sense of public 
loyalty. In England and Wales, the major county council areas designated by the 1974 local 
government reform are used (the so-called shire counties) along with the metropolitan 
counties, and Greater London. In Scotland, we employ the 6 regions used since 1999 for 
elections to the Scottish Parliament. These units were chosen in preference to the current 
local authority map as the latter is very fragmented and diverse, with substantial variation in 
the size of the main local government areas, whereas the 1974 geography was more uniform 
in terms of the populations capture within each of the major county areas. Across the 62 areas 
we identify at this level, the average district contained 436 CIPS respondents (though this 
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was notably higher in some areas). Finally, the third geographical scale considered here is 
that of the 11 standard government regions: on average, there are 1349 respondents in each. 
 
Two different measures of the local climate of opinion are estimated at each scale using the 
CIPS data: the percentage of respondents in each area who felt the national economic 
situation had become a lot worse over the previous year; and the percentage who reported 
being affected ‘a great deal’ by the financial crisis. As discussed earlier, there was a 
considerable mood of pessimism in 2010, so these measures give an indication of where the 
most pessimistic areas were. Levels of deep pessimism vary substantially from place to place 
(table 5). Inevitably, the estimates are rather more provisional at the constituency level than at 
county or regional scales, as they are based on considerably fewer individuals. Even so, we 
would expect, a priori, a greater range of responses the more local the scale, as some of the 
‘highs’ and ‘lows’ will tend to average out as we look at larger and larger areas. And that is, 
indeed, what is observed. At the constituency scale, for instance, the percentage of 
individuals saying the national economy had become a lot worse ranged from 0% in some 
areas to 73% in others. The range at the ‘county’ scale was narrower, but still substantial, 
from 16% to 42%. And it was narrower still at the regional scale – from 23% to 32%. Similar 
patterns hold for the percentages saying they personally had been affected a great deal by the 
financial crisis. In the most pessimistic constituencies on this measure, almost 50% of 
respondents held this view, while in some no respondent made this claim. The equivalent 
ranges for the county and regional scales were 5%-19% and 10%-14% respectively. 
 
The impact of the local climate of economic opinion is assessed by adding these variables to 
the baseline models presented in table 4. Nine separate models are estimated, three – one for 
each party’s vote – at each of the three scales.
8
 The key results are displayed in table 6 (only 
the coefficients for the ‘climate of opinion’ variables at each scale are given; the coefficients 
for the other variables included in the baseline model are not substantially altered by the 
addition of these). The coefficients tell a consistent – but intriguing – story.  
 
Whichever scale we look at, and controlling for a range of other factors (including 
individuals’ personal views on the state of the national economy and on how much they had 
been affected by the financial crisis), the higher the percentage of people in an area reporting 
the opinion that the national economy had considerably worsened over the preceding year, 
the lower the likelihood that individuals living there would vote for the Labour government, 
and the higher the chance of voting for the Conservative opposition. A similar pattern holds 
for the percentages reporting being greatly affected by the crisis at regional scale, though not 
at the constituency or county scales. The odds of voting Liberal Democrat, meanwhile, were 
not on the whole affected by the local climate of economic opinion. Only two ‘climate of 
opinion’ coefficients achieved statistical significance in that party’s vote models, both at the 
regional scale. The higher the percentage of people in a respondent’s region who thought the 
national economy had declined a great deal, and the higher the proportion in the region 
reporting they had been affected a great deal by the economic crisis, the more likely it was 
that the respondent would vote Liberal Democrat.  
 
These results are consistent with the argument that voters are influenced not only by their 
local economic context when deciding to vote, but also by the local climate of economic 
opinion. Consistent with the valence argument, the more pessimistic the balance of opinion in 
an area, the less likely its residents were to vote for the government in 2010, and the more 
likely they were to vote for the main party of opposition – even when we control for their 
own economic views, and for the objective state of their local economy (as indexed by the 
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JSA variables). Voters in 2010 were not basing their decisions only on what they themselves 
saw and thought about the economy, but were also moved by what others in their 
communities thought. This marks a significant step forward in our understanding of 
contextual effects in voting, as previous studies have focussed on the objective state of the 
local economy and/or on individuals’ self-evaluations of local conditions. Before now, no 
studies, to the best of our knowledge, have shown that the balance of local opinion matters 
too. Yet it does. 
 
But even more intriguing is that both the size and the strength of the ‘climate of opinion’ 
effects increase substantially as we move from the relatively local scale of the parliamentary 
constituency to the county and then again to the regional scale: the bigger the area 
considered, the greater the influence of the general balance of opinion on voters’ decisions. 
The differences in coefficient size as we move from local to wider scales are very substantial. 
For instance, regional scale coefficients for the percentage of respondents in different areas 
saying they felt the national economy had become much worse over the previous year were 
on average ten times larger than the equivalent constituency-level coefficients, and around 
four times larger than the county-level coefficients, Similarly large inter-scale differences in 
coefficient size are also evident for the percentage locally saying they personally had been 
affected a great deal by the economic crisis.  On the face of things, this seems surprising, as 
we might expect a true ‘climate of opinion’ effect to be strongest at those scales where 
individuals are best placed to have a reasonable idea of what most of those around them think 
– and those scales are much more likely to be local than to be county- or region-wide. 
Furthermore, this seems contrary to work on the scale at which the neighbourhood effect 
‘works’, which suggests local contexts are much more important than broader, regional ones 
(Johnston, Pattie et al., 2000; Johnston et al.,  2007). 
 
In part, this is almost certainly an artefact of the crisper estimates we are able to obtain at the 
county and regional scales compared to the constituency scale. Other things being equal, 
larger sub-samples at these scales mean smaller standard errors on estimates and fewer 
random errors. But we suspect there is more going on here than just this. Crisper standard 
errors might lead to clearer messages on statistical significance, but why should this also lead 
to larger coefficients?  
 
These results may reflect the fact that local economies are rarely contained just within one 
parliamentary constituency. Travel-to-work areas (TTWAs), for instance, illustrate the point 
that commuter zones and labour markets in many parts of the country cover relatively large 
areas encompassing the major metropolitan centres. Good or bad economic performance in 
one part of a TTWA may have knock-on consequences for people in other parts of the 
TTWA. Individuals may be influenced by more than just their immediate locality’s economic 
performance, therefore: even residents of an affluent constituency in an otherwise stagnating 
region might feel increasingly anxious about the economy’s future prospects – especially if 
they are highlighted in local media. 
 
At a broader scale, therefore, these findings may capture the impact of local media markets 
(city-wide for local newspapers and radio stations, region-wide for regional television news 
broadcasts from both BBC and ITV) and their reporting on economic trends in their area. If 
local media outlets’ economic coverage is dominated by ‘bad news’ stories, that may well 
lead – even without conversations between individual voters in the area – to a generally 
depressed view of the situation. More buoyant local economies, meanwhile, may produce 
fewer depressing economic stories. To the extent that it is through the local media that many 
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individuals get their fullest picture of how their local economy is faring, therefore, we might 
reasonably expect that local media market areas – crudely captured here by county- and 
regional-level scales – should become important contexts in setting local climates of opinion. 
 
Conclusions 
While the severe economic downturn in the UK (and world) economy after 2007 did not 
(quite) deliver a clear victory to the Conservative opposition at the 2010 election (the party 
was only able to form a government in coalition with the Liberal Democrats), it certainly 
contributed to the Labour government’s defeat (and the party’s worst election result since 
1983). Having built its success largely on a reputation for economic competence, the longest-
serving Labour government in British history was brought down by a combination of market 
failure and hubris. Far from solving the problems of ‘boom and bust’, Gordon Brown’s 
government fell victim to the largest economic crisis in over half a century. Going into the 
election, most voters were all too aware of the gloomy economic situation, felt anything but 
optimistic about the future, and as a result many turned against the government.  
 
As in previous contests, the election result was also shaped by Britain’s changing economic 
geography. The greater the increase in the local unemployment rate in a constituency between 
2005 and 2010, the more votes the Labour government lost there.  But more than that, voters’ 
decisions were influenced by the local climate of opinion regarding the economy. Voters’ 
valence evaluations were shaped by their own situations (which in turn were influenced to 
some degree by the state of the local economy). But they were also influenced – as 
demonstrated for the first time here – by the opinions of those they lived among. Other things 
(including the objective state of the local economy) being equal, the more pessimistic local 
views of the economy, the less likely individuals were to vote for the Labour government and 
the more likely they were to vote for the opposition Conservatives. 
 
But most striking of all, by a considerable margin, the ‘climate of opinion’ variables have 
their clearest and most substantial influence at the regional, not the constituency or county, 
scale. This stands in direct contradiction to other work on contextual effects, which shows 
that local contexts matter considerably more than broader ones (Johnston et al., 2007). What 
is more, no voter can hope to encounter more than a very small proportion of individuals at 
the regional scale: we are unlikely to be picking up a conversation effect, therefore. Rather, 
we suspect the key factor here is related to economic reporting in the regional media, 
particularly via regional television news. Contrary to the implications of recent work on the 
subject, contextual effects can, it seems, be generated at a regional as well as a more local 
level. Regions remain important reference points for voters when it comes to large issues 
such as the state of the economy; after all, so much media attention is paid to regional 
variations – often expressed as the ‘north-south’ divide – that it is not surprising that such 
broad variations become ingrained in the public consciousness, as part of a ‘them-and-us’ set 
of attitudes which sees one set of regions as generally favoured by public policy and others 
disadvantaged.  
 
It is hardly surprising that contextual effects which depend on inter-personal contact, such as 
conversations between individuals or some forms of campaign mobilisation, tend to be more 
efficacious when very local. But not all contextual effects are of this kind. Few voters are so 
naive as to think the economy begins and ends on their doorstep: most look to wider scales 
when evaluating government performance on this most important factor. But they are moved 
not only by the hard economic facts, but also by the shared optimism or pessimism of others 
in the areas in which they live, especially when these areas are large enough to capture a 
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broad sense of how the economy is really faring. Regional economic geographies, both 
substantive and affective, still matter in British elections. 
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Notes 
 
1   The 2010 election in England and Wales was fought in different constituencies to those 
used in 2005: we therefore use Press Association estimates of the 2005 election results had 
that contest been held in the new seats: Rallings and Thrasher, 2007). Scotland’s 
constituencies were redrawn prior to the 2005 election, so the 2005 results there are the 
actual election outcomes. 
2  The models were checked for potential multicollinearity problems. In all cases, variance 
inflation factors were well inside conventionally accepted ranges, suggesting no 
difficulties. 
3  A total of 629 constituencies were employed here, three fewer than the total number of 
632 seats in Great Britain at the 2010 election. Two (Ealing Southall and Enfield 
Southgate) had no BES CIPS respondents. Respondents living in the Buckingham 
constituency, which was represented in 2010 by the Speaker of the House of Commons 
and hence was not contested by the major parties, were also excluded. 
4  Once again, checks for multicollinearity using variance inflation factors revealed no 
problems. 
5  Binary logistic models were used in preference to a multinomial logit for ease of 
exposition. The core analyses reported here have also been examined using the 
multinomial form: no major conclusions are affected. 
6  The exact question wording for national economic evaluations was: “How do you think 
the general economic situation in this country has changed over the last twelve months? 
Has it: got a lot worse; got a little worse; stayed the same; got a little better; got a lot 
better; don’t know?” The question wording for exposure to the economic crisis was: 
“Have you personally been affected by the financial crisis that is affecting world markets”, 
and the options were: a great deal; somewhat; not much; not at all; and don’t know. 
7  ACORN is a commercial socio-demographic classification of British residential 
neighbourhoods, produced by CACI Ltd.. It combines data from the UK census and other 
government reports with information from lifestyle surveys to produce a hierarchical 
classification of neighbourhoods (built up from postcode levels) into 5 categories, 17 
groups and 56 types (types nest within groups, and groups within categories). More 
information on the classification can be found on CACI’s web site: 
http://www.caci.co.uk/acorn-classficication.aspx.  
8  As the three scales nest together – constituencies within counties within regions – there is 
some correlation between the various measures, raising the potential for multicollinearity 
problems if all three scales were entered simultaneously into the same equation. To avoid 
this, it was decided to model each scale in a separate model. Even so, the correlations are 
generally relatively modest. The constituency-county correlation for the percentage of 
people saying the national economy had become much worse was 0.378, while the 
constituency-region correlation was 0.205, and the county-region correlation was 0.547.  
The equivalent correlations for  the percentage reporting they had been affected a great 
deal by the economic crisis were (constituency-county) 0.328, (constituency-region) 
0.160, and (county-region) 0.294, We have experimented with models (not reported here) 
containing measures at all three scales simultaneously: the basic conclusions are 
unaffected. As local opinions on the state of the economy are shaped in part by objective 
local economic conditions, there is also a risk of multicollinearity between the 
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constituency unemployment measures and the different measures of the local climate of 
economic opinion. However, as in previous models, an examination of the variance 
inflation factors for all the coefficients in each model showed that multicollinearity was 
not present: the VIF scores were all well within conventionally acceptable levels. 
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Figure 1: UK seasonally adjusted quarterly GDP trends, 1997-2011 (2006=100) 
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Figure 2: UK seasonally adjusted unemployment rate, 1997-2010 (source: Labour Force 
Survey) 
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Table 1:  Pre-election economic evaluations, 2010 (source: 2010 BES CIPS) 
 
 State of personal finances State of national economy 
 Change over last 
12 months 
Change over 
next 12 months 
Change over last 
12 months 
Change over 
next 12 months 
 % % % % 
Lot worse 15.4 9.7 28.4 11.1 
Little worse 36.0 27.5 29.8 22.5 
Same 34.2 40.3 18.7 28.1 
Little better 12.4 20.2 22.4 36.4 
Lot better 2.0 2.3 0.7 2.0 
N 13088 12595 12987 12341 
 
 
 
Table 2: Pre-election assessments of who is best able to deal with Britain’s economic 
problems, 2010 (source: 2010 BES CIPS) 
 
Which party best?   Which leader best?  
 %   % 
Labour  31.3  Brown 29.7 
Conservatives 35.2  Cameron 32.9 
Liberal Democrats 20.5  Clegg 10.9 
Don’t know 13.0  Don’t know 26.6 
N 13356   13356 
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Table  3: Constituency vote shares in 2010 and local economic situation: OLS regression 
models  
 
 Labour % 
2010 
Conservative 
% 2010 
Liberal 
Democrat % 
2010 
Party % vote share 2005:    
Labour % 2005 0.91**   
Conservative % 2005  0.98**  
Liberal Democrat % 2005   0.90** 
% claimant count, May 2010 2.78** -0.66** -0.84** 
Change in % claimant count, May 2005 – May 2010 -5.21** 1.11** 1.53** 
Constant -5.51** 5.09 3.83 
R
2
 0.91 0.95 0.83 
N 631 631 631 
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Table 4 Baseline models: The economy and voting at the 2010 election (source: 2010 BES CIPS) 
Vote 2010 Labour Conservative Liberal Democrat 
Vote 2005 (comparison = did not vote) 
Labour  2.02** -0.52** 0.03 
Conservative  -2.22** 2.88** -1.20** 
Liberal Democrat  -1.02** -0.55** 2.25** 
Other -0.22 -0.07 -0.31** 
Too young 0.36+ 0.31 0.44* 
Don’t remember 0.05 0.34** 0.55** 
Respondent’s pre-election retrospective evaluation of national economic situation (comparison = got a lot worse) 
Little worse 0.48** -0.33** 0.17** 
Stayed same 0.76** -0.48** 0.12 
Little better 1.32** -1.04** 0.07 
Lot better 2.23** -0.90* -0.66 
Respondent’s pre-election self-reported level of exposure to the financial crisis (comparison = a great deal) 
Somewhat 0.15 0.03 -0.01 
Not much 0.36** -0.16+ 0.03 
Not at all 0.19+ -0.16 0.09 
Respondent’s main source of income (comparison = employment) 
Pension -0.01 0.11+ -0.28** 
Benefits 0.17+ -0.27* -0.26* 
Other -0.23 -0.07 0.05 
% claimant count in constituency, May 2010 0.14** -0.10** -0.09** 
% point change in constituency claimant count, May 2005-May 2010 0.08 0.08 -0.01 
ACORN constituency classification (comparison = ‘ACORN Wealthy Achievers’)    
ACORN Urban Prosperity 0.36** -0.21* 0.08 
ACORN Comfortably Off 0.13+ -0.04 -0.07 
ACORN Moderate Means 0.43** -0.26** -0.03 
ACORN Hard-Pressed 0.39** -0.30** -0.31** 
Constant -2.23 -1.18 -0.96 
    
-2 log likelihood 13690.16 15786.99 13967.55 
Model improvement 4875.16 5670.24 2752.57 
Significance 0.000 0.000 0.000 
% correctly classified 83.5 84.9 81.6 
Nagelkerke R2 0.49 0.51 0.29 
N 12430 12430 12430 
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Table 5 Local climates of economic opinion, 2010 (source: 2010 BES CIPS) 
 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Standard 
deviation 
N 
Constituency scale      
% saying national economy had become a lot worse 0.0 73.3 28.8 12.0 629 
% saying they had been greatly affected by financial crisis 0.0 47.3 12.2 8.4 629 
County scale      
% saying national economy had become a lot worse 16.5 41.5 28.6 5.1 62 
% saying they had been greatly affected by financial crisis 5.4 19.3 11.9 3.2 62 
Regional scale      
% saying national economy had become a lot worse 22.7 32.3 28.5 2.6 11 
% saying they had been greatly affected by financial crisis 9.7 13.9 12.1 1.4 11 
 
Table 6 Baseline models plus ‘local climate of opinion’ at different scales: (source: 2010 BES CIPS)  
 
Vote 2010 Labour Conservative Liberal 
Democrat 
Baseline model plus local climate of opinion at constituency scale    
% in constituency reporting national economy a lot worse -0.007** 0.006* -0.002 
% in constituency reporting being affected ‘a great deal’ by financial crisis -0.004 0.001 0.004 
    
Baseline model plus local climate of opinion at county scale    
% in county reporting national economy a lot worse -0.016** 0.014* 0.007 
% in county reporting being affected ‘a great deal’ by financial crisis -0.019+ 0.018+ 0.014 
    
Baseline model plus local climate of opinion at government region scale    
% in region reporting national economy a lot worse -0.049** 0.056** 0.031** 
% in region reporting being affected ‘a great deal’ by financial crisis -0.059** 0.082** 0.047* 
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